Fiscal rules, public investment, and growth by Serven, Luis
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4382






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4382
Solvency is an intertemporal concept, relating to 
the present value of revenues and expenditures, and 
encompassing both assets and liabilities. But the 
standard practice among policy makers, financial market 
participants and international financial institutions is 
to assess the strength of the fiscal accounts solely on the 
basis of the cash deficit. Short-term cash flows matter, 
but a preponderant focus on them can encourage 
governments to invest too little, especially during 
episodes of fiscal tightening. This has potentially adverse 
This paper—a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at lserven@worldbank.org. 
consequences for growth and, paradoxically, even for 
fiscal solvency itself. The paper offers an overview of 
the links between fiscal targets, public investment, and 
public sector solvency. After reviewing the international 
experience with public investment under fiscal 
adjustment, the paper lays out an analytical framework 
to illustrate the consequences of using the public deficit 
as a guide to solvency. The paper then discusses some 
alternatives to conventional cash deficit rules and their 
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Public sector solvency has to do with the government’s assets and liabilities, its 
future revenues and expenditures. It possesses, by definition, an intertemporal dimension. 
In practice, however, financial markets and multilateral institutions routinely assess the 
strength of public finances on the basis of the cash deficit, that is, the rate of acquisition 
of liabilities by the public sector. Such practice amounts to ignoring public assets or, 
equivalently, the future income of the public sector and the intertemporal dimension of 
solvency. 
 
Following this practice, fiscal adjustment programs, and their monitoring, typically 
focus on the time path of the government deficit. Because current and capital expenditure 
have identical effects on short-term government cash flows, and adjustment programs 
rarely set expenditure composition targets, the burden of fiscal adjustment tends to fall 
disproportionately on public investment and other productive expenditures of the public 
sector. Recent experiences of industrial and emerging countries attest to this conclusion.
1  
 
The use of public sector cash flow as sufficient statistic of fiscal discipline is 
especially problematic for those countries that face the task of building up their basic 
infrastructures, as is the case of most developing countries as well as newcomers to the 
European Union (EU). Such task demands a large investment effort that, under the action 
of conventional public deficit targets, would have to be financed through major increases 
in tax collection, entailing potentially large distortions and running counter to the 
objectives of tax smoothing and intergenerational equity.
2  
 
The alternative is to restrict the accumulation of productive assets to protect public 
sector cash flows. This, however, entails a cost in terms of future growth, and thereby an 
adverse impact on the future cash flows of the public sector, owing to the weakened 
growth of its revenue base. Thus, enhancing the government’s current cash flows may 
not be an effective strategy to strengthen public solvency. This means that the 
conventional cash deficit is not a good guide to the strength of public finances, and hence 
other fiscal targets may do better at helping protect solvency without distorting the 
composition of spending and jeopardizing growth.  
 
This paper offers an analytical review of the links between fiscal targets, public 
investment, and growth.
3 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews 
the international experience with public investment in the context of fiscal adjustment. 
Section III examines the arithmetic of solvency and its practical application. Section IV 
reviews alternatives to conventional cash deficit targets. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
 
1 For empirical evidence on the behavior of public investment and other government expenditure items in 
fiscal adjustment episodes, see Balassone and Franco (2000), Easterly and Servén (2003), Galí and Perotti 
(2003) and IMF (2003). 
2 This view is stressed by Buiter (2004) and Buiter and Grafe (2004). 
3 Key references in this literature are Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), Buiter and Grafe (2004), and Mintz 
and Smart (2006). See also Easterly and Servén (2003).   2
II. Fiscal Adjustment and Public Investment 
 
The macroeconomic literature has long acknowledged that fiscal adjustment 
episodes tend to include disproportionate public investment cuts. Such phenomenon has 
been amply documented in both developing and industrial countries.
4 Regarding the 
former, a recent independent evaluation of a large set of IMF-sponsored fiscal programs 
concluded that, in most cases, the restrictive fiscal measures led to a public investment 
contraction that proved excessive ex post (IMF 2003).  
 
The experience of Latin America is particularly revealing in this sense. Over the 
last two decades, most of the countries in the region adopted fiscal adjustment measures 
that led to significant increases in the primary surplus. In most countries, the adjustment 
included a drastic contraction of public infrastructure investment. This is illustrated in the 
top panel of figure 1, which depicts the trajectories of the primary fiscal deficit and public 
infrastructure investment,
5 both as percent of GDP, for the average of eight Latin 
American countries. It is apparent from the graph that the decline in the primary deficit, 
from around 5 percent of GDP in the early1980s to about zero by 2000, was accompanied 
by a permanent fall in infrastructure investment, from an average of 3.5 percent of GDP 
in the early 1980s to 1.5 percent by the turn of the century.  
 
The decline in public infrastructure investment affected virtually all countries 
(Calderón and Servén 2004a).
7 On average, it accounted for some 40 percent of the 
observed fiscal adjustment. This is remarkable because public infrastructure investment 
represents a small fraction of GDP, and a relatively small part of overall public 
expenditure. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of figure 1, which shows the average 
ratio of public infrastructure investment to the sum of public consumption plus public 
infrastructure investment -- a rough proxy for the overall primary expenditure of the 
public sector, for which information is not available. The graph shows that in the early 
1980s infrastructure investment accounted for just under one-fourth of this expenditure 
aggregate. By the late 1990s, the proportion had declined to 10 percent. In other words, in 
the process of fiscal adjustment, investment fell much more abruptly than consumption. 
Indeed, in a majority of countries public consumption rose relative to GDP, while public 
infrastructure investment fell, implying that the public investment cuts partly financed an 
expansion of public consumption. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Roubini and Sachs (1989) and de Haan, Sturn, and Sikken (1996) document the experience of industrial 
countries, and Hicks (1991) summarizes the facts on developing countries. Another reflection of the same 
empirical regularity is the fact that among all budget items public investment displays the highest volatility, 
a consequence of its strongly procyclical behavior. This is shown by Talvi and Végh (2000) using data 
from developing countries, and by Lane (2003) with data from industrial countries. 
5 As defined here, infrastructure includes land transportation, power, telecommunications, and water and 
sanitation.  
7 Jonakin and Stephens (1999) also document the decrease in Latin America’s public investment over this 
period.    3
Figure 1 
 






A. Primary Deficit and Public Investment









































































































Primary Deficit Public Investment in Infrastructure
Sources: Calderón and Servén (2004a); and Fitch database.
B. Public Investment in Infrastructure
























































































Sources: Calderón and Servén (2004a); and World Development Indicators.  4
Figure 2 
 
European Union: fiscal adjustment and public investment 
 
A. Primary deficit and Public investment 




























































































Primary Deficit Public Investment
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
B. Primary deficit and transport investment















































































Primary Deficit Transport Investment
Sources: World Development Indicators - World Bank; and provisional data from ECMT. Notes: 
(a) Total =  Roads + Rails + Airports. (b) 11 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
C. Public Investment
























































Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.  5
The experience of industrial countries is not much different. For example, an 
analysis of 32 episodes of fiscal adjustment in countries of the EU during the last two 
decades shows that in 25 of the 32 episodes public investment fell as percentage of GDP, 
and in 23 episodes investment fell more than other primary expenditure. Along the same 
lines, the evidence suggests that fulfillment of the Maastricht deficit targets sped up the 
decline of public investment in the EU countries: of the nine countries that exceeded the 
deficit target in 1992, eight met it in 1997; in all eight, public investment had fallen 
relative to GDP; and in seven, it had fallen relative to total primary expenditure as well. 
Conversely, three of the six countries that met the target in 1992 raised their public 
investment in the subsequent years (Balassone and Franco 2000).  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the EU experience. Like in figure 1 above, the top panel shows 
the trajectories of public investment and the primary fiscal deficit, both as ratios to GDP. 
There is a clear comovement between the two series, with investment falling sharply 
during the fiscal adjustment of the 1980s as well as during the post-Maastricht period. 
Unlike in figure 1, public investment is not limited here to infrastructure; instead, it is 
inclusive of other categories. Nevertheless, the middle panel of figure 2 suggests that the 
situation was no different for infrastructure investment. The graph plots public 
investment in transport and communication along with the primary fiscal deficit. Again, 
we find a clear comovement between public investment and the primary deficit, with a 
steady contraction in both following the Maastricht agreement of 1992. 
 
Finally, the bottom panel of figure 2 shows the trajectory of public investment 
relative to overall primary spending of the public sector. There is an apparent downward 
trend, which tends to accelerate at times of fiscal adjustment, indicating that public 
investment falls more than proportionately during fiscal crunches. Indeed, econometric 
estimations confirm that the public investment-to-total primary expenditure ratio shows a 
significantly positive association with the primary deficit, even after accounting for a 
time trend (which is itself negative and significant).
8 
 
To summarize, the recent drive toward fiscal discipline has been associated, more 
often than not, with a persistent infrastructure investment crunch.
9 This, of course, is not 
necessarily a cause for concern. The reduction in public investment might reflect 
efficiency enhancements, improved public procurement, or reduced corruption, allowing 
the same services to be provided at a lower investment cost. Also, if private and public 
capital are close substitutes, the public sector retrenchment may have been fully offset by 
private sector entry, without any adverse impact on service provision. Finally, public 
investment contraction might be a perfectly sensible strategy in a context in which the 
stock of public capital already has reached its target level, or following a shift in priorities 
toward other productive expenditures––such as education or health––not viewed as 
investment in the national accounts. 
 
                                                 
8 Galí and Perotti (2003) stress the negative trend. The estimations mentioned in the text, reported in Servén 
(2004), employ a SUR procedure with fixed effects. A significant positive association is also found 
between the investment-to-GDP ratio and the primary deficit. 
9 Estache (2005) shows that this has been the case also in Sub-Saharan Africa.   6
There is a grain of truth in all these arguments. For example, in Latin America, the 
decline in public infrastructure investment was accompanied by the opening of most 
infrastructure sectors to private initiative. But the results were uneven: total investment 
(public plus private) fell in all infrastructure sectors except telecommunications (see 
Easterly and Servén 2003, chapter 2; Calderón and Servén 2004a). In fact, the countries 
that managed to attract higher private investment into such sectors were those that had 
maintained higher levels of public investment, which suggests that private and public 
investment may complement rather than substitute each other, contrary to the previous 
argument. 
 
Moreover, the fall in total investment––reflecting the decline in public investment 
and the limited response of private investment––was in many cases so large that it is hard 
to explain in terms of efficiency gains and reductions in investment costs. In some Latin 
American countries, infrastructure investment has fallen to 1 to 2 percent of GDP, a level 
that can barely cover the depreciation of existing assets––and this in spite of the fact that 
in most cases infrastructure asset stocks remain wholly inadequate.
10 In some EU 
countries, public investment has likewise fallen to levels that, according to some 
estimates, probably imply asset decumulation.
11 
 
III. The Theory and Practice of Fiscal Solvency 
 
The seeming anti-investment bias of fiscal discipline likely reflects several factors. 
Among them, political economy considerations are surely key: it is politically much 
harder to cut pensions or public sector wages at times of fiscal stringency than to cancel 
infrastructure projects. However, public deficit and debt rules also play a major role. 
Such rules aim to protect the solvency of the public sector, but they often do so at the cost 
of distorting the composition of public expenditures. 
 
III.1 The Arithmetic of Public Sector Solvency 
 
  The concept of fiscal solvency follows from the intertemporal budget constraint 
of the public sector, which in essence prevents the government from running a Ponzi 
scheme in which interest payments on outstanding debt are financed by issuing more 
debt. Ultimately, interest payments must be financed, at least in part, through primary 
surpluses. The starting point for the arithmetic of solvency is the identity defining the 
trajectory of the public debt stock:  
 
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t I t C t T t B t r t B − − − =
•
     (1) 
 
where B is the stock of public debt, r is the short-term real interest rate, T is public 
revenue, and C and I respectively represent the current and (gross) investment 
                                                 
10 See World Bank (2005) for an assessment of infrastructure investment needs in Latin America. 
11 See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004).    7
expenditures of the public sector.
12 It can be seen that the distinction between current and 
investment expenditure is of little consequence for the contemporaneous rate of debt 
accumulation (that is, the overall deficit). From this expression, we can compute the debt 
stock at instant t+u as follows: 
[] ds s I s C s T e t B e u t B
u t
t
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As noted, the intertemporal budget constraint prevents the government from 
forever financing interest payments on its debt through additional debt issue. This 
amounts to saying that debt cannot indefinitely grow at a rate in excess of the real interest 
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Thus, the present value of the stream of current and future primary surpluses must 
be no less than the initial public debt stock. In practice, the intertemporal budget 
constraint in equation (3) will always be met through appropriate adjustment of some 
residual fiscal variable––that is, taxes or public spending. Here we shall focus on the case 
in which the trajectories of these variables are given arbitrarily and the government has 
some initial debt B. Then the adjustment has to take the form of a suitable change in the 









eT s C s I s d s D B t
∞ −∫
− −− = ∫  
Here D is a “debt default discount factor,” endogenously determined so that the 
expression holds with strict equality. A value of D smaller than one corresponds to the 
case in which the present value of future primary surpluses falls short of the outstanding 
debt stock, and hence implies a debt write-down; conversely, a value above unity reflects 




For concreteness, we shall refer to the left-hand side of equation (3) as the public 
sector net worth (denoted NW), keeping in mind that the term is shorthand for the debt 
write-down (or up) required for the government’s budget constraint to hold with equality 
when the time paths of taxes and primary expenditures are exogenously given. Hence, the 
government’s net worth NW is positive (negative) if and only if D is greater (smaller) 
than one. Equivalently, NW can be viewed, after a sign change, as the present value of the 
                                                 
12 For simplicity, we have abstracted from seigniorage and inflation. Their inclusion would be 
straightforward but would require some additional notation. 
13 Conceptually, the “write-up” provides the way for the government to dispose of any “excessive” primary 
surpluses it may collect.    8
fiscal correction necessary to ensure long-run balance of the government budget (Bruce 
and Turnovsky 1999). 
 
In a growing economy, it is often more convenient to restate the solvency 
condition in terms of the debt-to-GDP ratio b.
14 Letting g denote the growth rate of real 
GDP, the trajectory of b is given by  
[] [ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t i t c t t b t g t r t b − − − − =
•
τ      
 
where the lowercase letters in the second square brackets denote the ratios to GDP of the 
corresponding uppercase variables. In this notation, the solvency condition prevents debt 
as a percentage of GDP from indefinitely growing at a rate exceeding the difference 
between the real interest rate and the GDP growth rate, so that  
[]
0 ) ( lim
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As before, we let nw(t) denote the left-hand side of equation (3a). To highlight the role of 
public investment and public capital (or, more broadly, of public expenditure that 
generates future revenue), it is convenient to break up total revenues into two 
components: one that captures the direct financial return on the public capital stock, and 
another that includes all other income. Therefore,  K T T θ + =
~
, where K is the public 
capital stock, θ  is the gross financial rate of return captured by the government on each 
unit of public capital—for example, public service user fees minus operating costs––and 
T
~
 includes all other public revenues. Then we can rewrite (3a) as follows: 
 
[]
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ~ ) (
) ( ) (
t b ds s i s c s k s e t nw
t
dv v g v r
s




θ τ    (4) 
 
Here, k denotes the public capital-to-GDP ratio, whose time path is given by  
 
[] ) ( ) (
) (
) ( s k s g
p
s i
s k δ + − =          ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
14 The use of GDP as a scale variable is based on the implicit assumption that it is the main determinant of 
tax collection. If such a role corresponds instead to another macromagnitude—for example, aggregate 
consumption, as in the case of the value added tax—the latter would become the relevant scale variable. 






dv v g v r 0 ) ( ) ( lim . Otherwise, the government would be able to grow its way 
out of any debt stock no matter how large.   9
whereδ is the depreciation rate of public capital and p denotes its replacement cost. In 
general, p will reflect not only the market price of investment goods, but also other 
factors such as the efficiency of public procurement or the effects of corruption on the 
actual cost of new public capital (Keefer and Knack 2006; Pritchett 2000). Inefficient 
procurement, bribes and kickbacks will result, other things equal, in higher values of p. 
 
  It is easy to illustrate the effect of public investment on government net worth. 
Assume for the moment that the real interest rate and the growth rate are exogenously 
given (with r > g); we shall return to this assumption later. Assume further that the 
current expenditure, investment, and tax revenue ratios are also constant. Solving 
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    =− − − + −     +− +    
    (4a) 
 
where the zero subscript denotes the initial values of debt and public capital. The first 
term of this expression captures the government’s initial net assets. Their replacement 
cost is (pk0 – b0), but that of the capital stock pk0 needs to be adjusted multiplying by the 
return on capital relative to its user cost  / ( ) pr θ δ + . In turn, the second term of the 
expression captures the contribution to net worth of income and expenditure flows. 
Public investment appears multiplied by the ratio of the direct financial yield on public 
capital θ  to the user cost of capital  ) ( δ + r p . From this expression, the impact of a 
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   (6) 
 
Thus, an increase in public investment raises or reduces the government’s net worth 
depending on whether the financial rate of return on public capital θ  is greater or smaller 
than the user cost of capital  . ) ( p r δ +   
 
An equivalent way to illustrate the same point is to express the net worth of the 
government in terms of its net liabilities, b – pk. The expression equivalent to equation 
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rgst
t
nw t e s r p k s c s ds b t pk t τθδ
∞
−− − =+ − + − − −   ∫     (4b) 
 
                                                 
16 If the change were temporary, the present-value term (r-g)
-1 would from not appear in (6). 
17 To derive equation (4b), we just replace equation (5) into equation (4) and integrate the resulting 
expression.   10
In this formulation, solvency requires the present value of the government’s primary 
surplus on current account, net of the user cost of public capital, to be no less than the 
face value of net public liabilities––that is, debt minus capital. From equation (4b), it is 
clear that an increase in the public capital stock matched by an equal increase in public 
debt at time t (so that net liabilities b – pk remain unchanged) raises or lowers the net 
worth of the public sector depending on the sign of the return differential  () p r δ θ + − .
18 
 
Irrespective of the net worth effect of an investment increase, its impact on the 
primary surplus must be negative in the short run, while that on the debt-to-GDP ratio 
must be positive. Over time, as the extra capital is put in place and returns accrue at the 
rate θ , the primary surplus will rise and––provided that  p r ) ( δ θ + > ––the debt-to-GDP 
ratio will decline below its initial level.
19 This contrast between the short- and long-run 
effects on the primary surplus and debt is a reminder that cash flow can be a poor guide 
to solvency.  
 
These expressions illustrate the net worth effects of a debt-financed investment 
change. The effects of an investment expansion financed instead by cutting public 
consumption are much more straightforward: short-run cash flow is unchanged, but 
government net worth must rise if the net financial rate of return on public capital θ  is 
greater than zero.
20 Obviously, the composition of spending matters for net worth as long 
as financial rates of return differ across expenditure types––as is the case in this 
framework, which assumes that public consumption yields zero return.  
 
III.2 Public Investment, Growth, and Solvency  
 
  The above discussion shows that the effects on net worth of a public investment 
expansion depend on the direct financial return on public capital θ . However, the value 
of θ  is likely to vary greatly across investment types. User fees may cover the user cost 
of capital of government-owned utilities, but not that of untolled roads or sanitation 
projects, which often yield no direct financial return (that is,  0 θ ≤ ). Nevertheless, public 
                                                 
18 A fall in pk matched by an equal reduction in b could be interpreted as a privatization whose proceeds are 
used to retire public debt. Such transaction strengthens public finances only if  ) ( δ θ + > r p . This amounts 
to requiring that the government sell the capital assets at a price greater than the present value of the future 
financial returns that would have accrued from holding them. This might occur if the government smartly 
manages to overbill the private purchaser or, more realistically, if the returns that the purchaser can accrue 
(and hence the purchase price s/he is willing to pay) exceed those that the government would have obtained 
if it had retained the asset. 
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 as r >g. 
20 Of course, this need not always be the case. For example, if user fees charged for public services fall 
short of the direct costs of providing them, we would have θ  < 0.    11
investment projects may generate indirect financial returns to the government, to the 




The impact of public investment, and particularly infrastructure investment, on 
aggregate growth has attracted considerable attention in recent years.
22 An abundant body 
of empirical literature, beginning with Aschauer (1989), has sought to quantify the 
contribution of public capital to growth; see Calderón and Servén (2007) and Romp and 
de Haan (2005) for recent overviews. These studies typically are based on the estimation 
of aggregate production functions augmented with infrastructure stocks (for example, 
Calderón and Servén 2003, 2007; Canning 1999; Demetriades and Mamuneas 2000; 
Röller and Waverman 2001), or on empirical growth equations, including measures of 
public infrastructure or public investment among the explanatory variables (Aschauer 
1998; Calderón and Servén 2004b; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Esfahani and Ramirez 
2003). While far from unanimous, a majority of studies – especially those using physical 
asset stocks to measure infrastructure – find significantly positive effects of public capital 
on aggregate output and its growth rate, although the findings are less robust among those 
studies that use public investment flows (or their cumulative value) as regressors.
23  
 
One important implication of this literature is that evaluation of alternative fiscal 
strategies has to take into account their respective growth consequences, not just to gauge 
the economy’s future aggregate performance, but also to assess the full effects of the 
different fiscal policy paths on public finances themselves. Analytically, a simple 
illustration can be provided as follows. Assume that the economy’s aggregate production 
technology is of the form  
 
[ ]
α γ α − =
1 ) ( ) ( ) (
s e s L s K A s Y        (7) 
 
where L is labor,  0 and , 0 1 ≥ > > γ α denotes the rate of exogenous labor-augmenting 
technical progress (the appendix briefly reviews the case  1 = α  in which the marginal 
product of capital is constant). For simplicity, we ignore private capital and assume 
continuous full employment of the given labor supply L , which for convenience will be 
                                                 
21 This is well known to budgetary authorities in many countries, who often turn to overoptimistic growth 
projections as a last resort to balance public finances, even if only on paper.  
22 Analytically, numerous articles have explored the role of public investment in the growth process. Early 
on, the focus was on the flow of productive public services (Barro 1990; Turnovsky and Fisher 1995), but 
more recently, it has shifted to the accumulation of public infrastructure and/or human capital assets, whose 
services are viewed either as pure public goods (Futagami, Morita, and Shibata 1993; Ghosh and Roy 2004; 
Kalyvitis 2002) or public goods subject to congestion (Agénor 2004; Glomm and Ravikumar 1997; 
Turnovsky 1997). Zagler and Durnecker (2003) survey this literature. In these models, the impact of public 
investment on long-run growth is typically positive, but may change sign if public investment rises beyond 
a certain level. Furthermore, the growth-maximizing level of public investment may differ (most 
commonly, exceed) its welfare-maximizing level (for example, Turnovsky 1997). 
23 The likely reason is that investment spending may be a poor proxy for the accumulation of productive 
assets; see Pritchett (2000) and Keefer and Knack (2006).   12
set equal to one and ignored in what follows.
24 Hence,  ) 1 ( α γ − captures the growth of 
output due to exogenous factors affecting the productivity of public capital. Note that the 
marginal product of public capital is just  k K Y / α = ∂ ∂ . In this framework, the growth 
impact of a given change in the public investment ratio is smaller the higher the 
prevailing public capital-to-output ratio k. Furthermore, investment only affects the 
economy’s transitional dynamics; with a constant investment-to-output ratio, the growth 
rate of the economy converges to γ  in the long run. 
 
  Assuming a constant real interest rate r (with  γ > r ), as well as constant public 
consumption, investment, and tax ratios to GDP, the appendix shows that net worth is 








nw k b c i H
rrp r p k
θθ
τ
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    =− + − + −     +− + +    
  (8) 
 
The two terms in square brackets are identical to equation (4a) above, with the long-run 
growth rate γ replacing g.  But here the second term is multiplied by a factor H(.) that 
captures the effect of net investment on output growth. It is straightforward to verify
25 










H(1) = 1. Hence when investment is just sufficient to keep the public capital-output ratio 
constant, the growth rate is equal toγ , and net worth (8) reduces to the simpler version 
(4a).
26 Aside from that particular situation, H(.) > 1 if  0() ip k γ δ >+ , so that the capital-
output ratio is rising, and H(.) < 1 in the opposite case. 
 
Using equation (8), it is straightforward to compute the change in net worth 
arising from a change in the public investment ratio. To simplify the algebra, it will be 
convenient to assume that we start from a situation with  ) ( 0 δ γ + = pk i , so that initially 
the capital-to-output ratio is not changing. Holding the public consumption and tax 
collection ratios constant, we get:  
                                                 
24 It would be straightforward to add a labor supply decision in the model, derived from consumer 
optimization. In contrast, allowing for endogenously determined private capital accumulation would add 
considerable complication to the analysis, and we shall not pursue that extension here. 
25 Here we have defined  21
0 0
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where 2F1(.) is Gauss’ hypergeometric function, which can be expressed in integral form as 
∫
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26 The same happens if  0 = α , so that output is unaffected by the public capital stock. In such case, H(.) = 
1 regardless of the value of i.  
.   13
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Where () 0 0 / YK k α ∂∂ = . If  γ > r , as assumed, the denominator of this expression is 
positive. The expression boils down to equation (6) when  0 = α , in which case the 
marginal product of public capital is also zero: the net worth effect of investment changes 
depends only on the (direct) rate of return on capital relative to its user cost. When  0 ≠ α , 
capital accumulation generates additional output and net government revenue, provided 
the net tax collection ratio  ) ~ ( c − τ  is positive. Hence, in this case, a rise in the public 
investment ratio increases net worth if the total financial return on the additional public 
capital—given by the sum of user fees plus the indirect tax revenue effect, the first two 
terms inside the curly brackets in equation (9)—exceeds its user cost. This is more likely 
to be the case the higher the marginal product of public capital and the net tax ratio, and 
the lower the user cost of capital. Furthermore, under the plausible assumption that the 
total financial return captured by the government on public capital cannot exceed its 
marginal product, equation (9) implies that a necessary condition for net worth to rise 
with an increase in the public investment ratio is that public capital be initially 
underprovided––that is,  0 () ( ) YK p rδ ∂∂ > + . 
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Thus, a deficit-financed investment expansion is more likely to raise government net 
worth the higher the initial ratio of public debt to public capital. Indeed, if the direct 
financial return on public capital fails to cover its user cost (that is, when  p r ) ( δ θ + < ), 
a necessary condition for net worth to rise with public investment is b0 > pk0, so that the 
government’s initial debt exceeds its capital stock.
27 The intuitive reason for this is that 
under such condition the additional growth associated with capital accumulation 
contributes to erode the government’s net liabilities, thereby enhancing its patrimonial 
position; this has been stressed by Easterly (1999) and Easterly and Servén (2003). As 
before, in the short run the public debt-to-output ratio is likely to rise following a deficit-
financed public investment expansion,
28 but if expressions (9) or (9a) are positive, the 
initial rise will be followed by a decline in the public debt ratio, which will eventually fall 
below its initial level.  
 
                                                 
27 This is also the case if the government’s net worth is initially positive. 
28 Starting from a position of zero net worth, the debt ratio will rise initially provided  0 / 1 0 ) ( b K Y ≤ ∂ ∂ , 
which is likely to hold unless indebtedness is very high or the public capital stock is very low.   14
So far we have assumed that the investment expansion is deficit-financed and the 
net tax collection ratio  ) ~ ( c − τ  remains constant relative to GDP. This amounts to 
assuming that the tax system is sufficiently elastic so that tax revenue rises in proportion 
with aggregate output.
29 What if the investment expansion were financed instead by an 
offsetting change in net tax collection? In such scenario di = d ) ~ ( c − τ , so that for given k 
the primary surplus ratio remains constant. In this simple framework, which abstracts 
from the distorting effects of taxation, net worth must unambiguously rise.
30 
 
3.3 Operations and Maintenance 
 
  The preceding discussion equates public investment with productive expenditure 
and public consumption with unproductive expenditure. In reality, things are more 
complicated: not all capital expenditure is productive – in the sense of increasing current 
and/or future output supply -- and not all current expenditure is pure waste. One 
important example of productive current public expenditure is that of operations and 
maintenance (O&M). While public investment in new roads or transport facilities usually 
attracts much more attention than O&M, the latter is essential for public capital to yield 
productive services. Information on these expenditures is generally hard to obtain, but 
anecdotal evidence suggests that they tend to be compressed even more sharply than 
investment at times of fiscal retrenchment. This should be a cause of concern, because 
inadequate maintenance reduces the productive contribution of capital assets and shortens 
their useful life. The key role of O&M has been duly recognized in recent analytical 
literature. For example, Rioja (2003a, 2003b) shows that if maintenance expenditures are 
too low, new investment in infrastructure can be growth- and welfare-reducing—while 
additional O&M spending has the opposite effect.  
 
We can easily expand the present analytical framework to accommodate O&M 
spending, as follows. Let z denote O&M expenditure per unit of public capital, and let 
z − = 0 θ θ ; hence  0 θ  denotes the direct return on public capital gross of O&M charges. 
Likewise, let  0 ' with ) / ( < = δ δ δ p z . Thus, an increase in maintenance spending has a 
dual effect: on the one hand, it reduces the instantaneous rate of return on existing public 
capital; on the other, it extends its useful life, so that the lower return accrues over a 
longer horizon. Depending on the relative magnitude of these two effects, raising z may 
raise or lower the present value of future primary surpluses. 
 
Formally, the impact on net worth of a deficit-financed change in O&M spending 
per unit of public capital z can be computed replacing θ  and δ into, equation (8), and 
                                                 
29 Public capital operating costs and maintenance spending may rise along with investment, but they are 
already included in θ . Regarding other current spending c, as well as revenue collection τ ~ , rather than 
assuming them fixed, we could let them vary with the long-run growth rate g. Empirically, however, the 
evidence seems consistent with the constancy assumption; see Calderón, Easterly, and Servén (2003). 
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for simplicity starting again from zero net worth and a constant capital-output ratio. 
Differentiating equation (8) we get:  
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(10) 
 
If the capital-creating effect of O&M expenditures, via reduced depreciation, 
exceeds the return-reducing effect of higher O&M costs, so that  0 1 ' < + δ , this expression 
is more likely to be positive than equation (9a) or, in other words, increased O&M has a 
more favorable effect on net worth than increased investment—and conversely if 
0 1 ' > + δ . We can define a critical level of O&M spending per unit of capital z*, such that 
1 *) ( ' − = z δ ; monotonicity of δ  ensures that z* is unique. As long as  * zz ≠ , a 
reallocation of expenditure between investment and O&M–keeping total primary 
spending constant––will yield higher growth and net worth. For z < z*, this can be 




3.4 Reality Checks 
 
So far we have assumed a constant real interest rate. This amounts to assuming 
that the government faces given borrowing terms in financial markets. In practice, 
interest rates may vary reflecting changing default premia, which are typically assumed 
to depend on the outstanding debt stock (as a ratio to GDP, say). In such case, the 
discount rate relevant for judging the solvency effects of public expenditure changes is 
the marginal cost of public debt, which in general will exceed its average cost, given by 
the prevailing interest rate. The reason is that a deficit-financed increase in investment (or 
in O&M spending) reduces the primary surplus and raises the debt stock in the short 
term––even if it may have the opposite effect in the long term––and thereby the default 
premium and the real interest rate.  
 
Consider, for example, the analytically convenient real interest rate specification 
)) ( / 1 ( ) ( t b b r t r − + = η , where  0   ,   and    , 0 > ≥ b r η  are given constants. If  0 > η , the 
interest rate rises with the public debt-to-GDP ratio. By choosing  0 ) 0 ( b b b = =  for 
simplicity (which implies that  r r = ) 0 ( ), it can be verified that the solvency impact of a 
change in public investment continues to be given by expressions (9) and (9a), but with r 
replaced by the marginal cost of public debt  η + r ––which is higher than the interest rate 
prevailing at time 0. Thus, the steeper the slope of the lending supply schedule––as 
                                                 
31 In general, the optimal choice between new investment and O&M spending depends on other factors in 
addition to their net worth impact; see Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004).   16
reflected by a larger η ––the less favorable (or more adverse) the impact on net worth of a 
deficit-financed public investment increase.
32 
 
A second caveat concerns the issue of uncertainty, which has been ignored so far. 
Yet the net worth calculations above involve estimates of future output, tax revenues, and 
user fees, all of which are intrinsically uncertain. In this framework, a simple way to take 
uncertainty into account would be to employ risk-adjusted discount rates to bring future 
cash flows to present value terms. This would amount to adding a risk premium to the 




The third caveat is the partial equilibrium setting used here, which neglects 
feedback effects on the productivity of public capital arising from endogenous changes in 
the supply of other inputs––labor or, most important, private capital––ignored in equation 
(7). In reality, changes in public investment will likely affect both the marginal 
productivity and the user cost of private capital and thus its rate of accumulation. If 
public and private capital are complements (as much of the empirical literature suggests), 
then increased public capital accumulation raises the marginal product of private capital 
and hence encourages private investment. In such case, the growth impact of public 
investment would be understated in the above analysis, as would be its contribution to 
government net worth. If public and private capital are complements instead, the 
conclusion would be reversed. On the other hand, if real interest rates are endogenous, a 
debt-financed public investment expansion may raise the user cost of private capital and 
crowd out private investment, and then the above results would overstate the growth and 
solvency contribution of public capital. Proper account of these general equilibrium 
effects requires a fully specified macroeconomic model, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 
3.5 Discussion  
 
The main point to be stressed is the key distinction between productive and 
unproductive expenditures that arises from the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint: their respective implications for solvency are different because the former 
finance the acquisition of assets accruing (directly or indirectly) future financial returns, 
while the latter do not.  
 
This, however, is rarely recognized in practice, because conventional fiscal targets 
are typically set in terms of cash deficit, paying scant attention to the composition of 
expenditure and the intertemporal budget constraint. This amounts to using short-term 
cash flow as the yardstick for solvency, which tends to discourage the adoption of any 
projects with negative short-term cash flows. Such category includes virtually all public 
                                                 
32 In other words, (9) and (9a) are more likely to be negative––except, in the case of the latter, when 
0 / 1 0 ) ( b K Y > ∂ ∂ , so that the debt ratio falls initially instead of rising, in which case the marginal cost of 
debt falls as well. 
33 Another alternative would be to introduce uncertainty explicitly and then examine the impact of public 
investment on the entire probability distribution of net worth.    17
infrastructure projects, even if their future returns exceed the user cost of capital––in 
which case such projects strengthen solvency and are consistent with good public 
economics. Only projects whose investment cost is fully financed by taxes would be 
exempted from these constraints––even though raising taxes today to fund the acquisition 
of long-lasting assets may represent bad public economics, as it may run counter to the 
objectives of tax smoothing and intergenerational equity.  
 
  Figure 3 illustrates the effects of net worth and cash-flow targets on the 
composition of public expenditure. Along the overall balance (solid) line in the graph, 
total primary expenditure c+i is constant relative to output; hence, for given tax rates and 
debt, so is the government’s overall balance. The slope of the line equals -1. In turn, 
along the dashed curve, which describes the contour set of equation (8), net worth is 
constant. The curve must be steeper than the overall balance line if public capital yields 
some financial return, whether through user fees or taxes. Furthermore, the slope of the 
curve is not constant. At low levels of investment, the public capital stock remains low 
and its return high, and hence the curve is very steep—it may even slope upward over an 
initial region, if the marginal unit of investment yields a financial return in excess of the 
cost of borrowing. In the graph, this happens in the segment of the curve between point D 
and the horizontal axis. As public investment rises, so does the public capital stock, its 
marginal financial return declines toward zero, and the net worth curve eventually 
becomes parallel to the overall balance line. Toward the northeast quadrant of the graph, 
both the overall balance and net worth deteriorate; toward the southwest, they improve. 
 
  The figure also illustrates the link between expenditure composition and fiscal 
performance indicators. Consider point E, where the two lines intersect. Movements 
along the overall balance line to the southeast of E—to a point such as B, say—leave the 
overall balance unchanged but reduce net worth. The reason is that zero-return current 
expenditure is being substituted for public investment. Conversely, as we move toward 
the northwest of E along the net worth curve—to a point such as A, say—the overall 
balance deteriorates but net worth is unchanged, precisely for the opposite reason.  
 
We could think of the government determining its spending composition in 
textbook fashion—at the tangency between (a) some indifference curve (not drawn) 
characterizing the government’s preferences between public consumption and investment 
and (b) the relevant constraint. Because the net worth line is steeper than the overall 
balance line, the government spending mix will generally be more biased toward 
consumption under binding cash-flow constraints than under net worth constraints. Thus, 
other things equal, governments facing binding cash-flow targets today may devote too 
few resources to expenditures that yield returns tomorrow. This is a simple consequence 
of the different trade-off between consumption and investment posed by net worth targets 
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Figure 3 
 
Cash-flow targets, net worth targets, and spending composition 
 
 
Overall balance line 






Related to these effects on the composition of expenditure, the use of the conventional 
public deficit to gauge the soundness of public finances also creates incentives for 
governments to adopt policy measures that ostensibly aim at "fiscal adjustment" but often 
are little more than accounting gimmicks. In light of the intertemporal budget constraint, 
such measures are of no consequence for fiscal solvency, and in some cases, they may 
even weaken public finances. The international experience highlights a wide variety of 
illusory adjustment measures, ranging from changes in the time profile of public revenues 
or expenditures without any change in their present value, to reductions in the rate of 
public debt issuance achieved through matching reductions in the rate of accumulation of 
public assets––a strategy that by itself has no effect on public sector net worth.
34 In terms 
of figure 3, a movement from A to E, for example, improves the overall balance but has 
no effect on solvency. 
 
Paradoxically, some governments have also resorted to creative tricks to shelter 
investment from the pressure of deficit limits. For example, many countries have made 
use of extra-budgetary financing of public investment, effectively hiding the latter from 
public view. Another popular option has been the issuance of contingent liabilities––such 
as credit or rate-of-return guarantees––to private investors, under partnership agreements 
between the public and private sectors. These arrangements can, and sometimes do, have 
efficiency-increasing effects, but they often leave the public sector bearing most or all of 
the investment risk, in which case they amount to little more than accounting gimmicks. 
Furthermore, the lack of clear standards for the budgetary accounting of such operations 
tends to weaken fiscal transparency, and in some countries, has allowed the accumulation 
of large hidden liabilities that surfaced unexpectedly––and with large fiscal 
consequences––when the government guarantees have been called on.
35 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates the fact that cuts in the public sector’s 
productive expenditures undertaken in the name of fiscal discipline may represent 
another form of fictitious adjustment. Their direct effect is to reduce the conventional 
public deficit and the rate of debt accumulation, but they may do so at the cost of a 
slowdown in growth and future fiscal revenue, which indirectly results in reduced future 
primary surpluses and undermines the fiscal adjustment itself. In terms of figure 3, a 




How important, in practice, is this indirect effect? From the preceding discussion, 
there are two key ingredients. The first is the growth impact of public investment, given 
by the marginal productivity of public capital as well as its acquisition cost. Other things 
equal, the marginal productivity is likely to be higher when the government has strong 
project selection capabilities, so that its investment involves top-quality projects, and 
when the initial endowment of public capital is low. It should also depend on the 
                                                 
34 Easterly (1999) and Easterly and Servén (2003, chapter 1) offer numerous examples. 
35 These issues are discussed at length by Irwin, Klein, Perry, and Thobani (1997) and Engel, Fischer, and 
Galetovic  (2003). 
36 Buiter (1990, chapter 13) offers a rigorous illustration of the scenario in which such kind of fiscal 
adjustment leads to a weakening of public finances.   20
composition of public investment. Some public investment projects (for example, in areas 
such as environmental conservation) unquestionably enhance welfare but have little 
effect on future output, while others (for example, major roads) may have a significant 
growth impact. Finally, if the purchase of public capital involves significant waste (i.e., p 
is high), changes in public investment may have only a minimal impact on asset 
accumulation and growth. 
 
The second ingredient is the government’s ability to capture at least part of the 
marginal return, via user fees or taxes––which, in the latter case, depends on the tax 
system and its administration. If these are deficient, and thus the output elasticity of fiscal 
revenue is low, then even projects with high growth impact may weaken public finances. 
 
These two ingredients reflect a multiplicity of country-specific factors, which are 
hard to quantify in general. Empirical studies have focused mainly on public 
infrastructure capital. Some recent estimates, using an aggregate production function 
approach in a large cross-country sample, find considerable international variation in the 
marginal productivity of infrastructure assets, with lower-income countries generally 
exhibiting higher marginal products because of their smaller public capital endowments. 
In the vast majority of countries, the marginal productivity of infrastructure assets 
exceeds that of other capital. 
37  
 
These estimates suggest that in many countries––especially poorer ones––the 
productivity of infrastructure capital likely exceeds its user cost. Still, from the solvency 
perspective, the question is how much of the return is actually captured by the 
government. For example, absent user fees, equation (9) implies that if the user cost of 
public capital is about 0.10 (say r = .06, 04 . = δ , p = 1), then the marginal (net) tax rate 
should be at least 0.20 if the government is to break even (in net worth terms) on a 
project yielding a marginal product equal to 0.50, in line with the estimates obtained for 
poor countries. This may seem like a modest requirement, but in effect it likely exceeds 
the revenue-raising abilities of many poor countries. 
 
The self-financing ability of public investment has attracted some empirical 
attention. Perotti (2004) assesses whether public investment can “pay for itself” using 
data from five rich countries––the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Australia––and focusing on total public investment. He evaluates a condition similar 
to equation (9) with  0 = θ , so that public capital accrues no direct financial return. In 
such case, whether public capital is self-financing depends on the sign of 
() ( ) [] δ τ + ∂ ∂ − − r p K Y c / / ) ~ ( 1 0 . This expression equals one if public investment yields no 
future income, and becomes negative if investment “pays for itself.” Using a VAR 
approach, Perotti finds that the empirical counterpart of this expression varies greatly 
across countries, ranging from above unity in Canada and the United Kingdom (which 
suggests a negative growth contribution of public capital at the margin), to 20 to 30 
percent in Australia and the United States, to zero or even negative values in Germany. 
 
                                                 
37 See Calderón and Servén (2007).   21
Perotti’s sample is made up of countries whose public capital stocks per capita are 
probably among the highest in the world. What about countries with lower endowments -
- and possibly higher marginal productivities too? Pereira and Pinho (2006) report 
calculations analogous to Perotti’s for 12 EU countries. In most of these countries, public 
investment is found to have large output growth effects. Their estimates suggest that 
investment is roughly self-financing in Ireland, France, and Greece, and more than self-
financing in Italy and Germany. In turn, Ferreira and Araujo (2005) perform a similar 
exercise using Brazilian data. The main methodological difference is that they use a 
vector error-correction model rather than a VAR. They find that public investment is 
generally self-financing in Brazil, although in most experiments it takes at least 10 years 
for the government to collect sufficient tax revenues to recoup the initial investment 
expenses. Because of this long lag, their results are somewhat sensitive to the real interest 
rate used to discount future revenues. 
 
Even if investment does not fully “pay for itself”, fiscal correction through public 
investment cuts may still be a very inefficient adjustment strategy if public capital is 
productive. This is illustrated by Calderón and Servén (2003) for the case of Latin 
America’s infrastructure. They make use of equation (4a), taking  0 = θ , and letting 
growth depend on the public investment ratio.
38 On the whole, their calculations suggest 
that the solvency-enhancing impact of infrastructure investment cuts falls quickly as the 
initial level of government indebtedness rises. At zero initial debt, cuts in infrastructure 
investment translate 100 percent into net worth increases, but the proportion declines to 
less than 60 percent if debt equals 40 percent of GDP, and to only 15 percent when debt 
reaches 80 percent of GDP. In the Latin American context of the late 1980s and 1990s, 
this means that infrastructure cuts in low-debt Colombia were 80 percent effective at 
enhancing solvency, whereas in high-debt Bolivia, their effectiveness was only around 20 
percent. These exercises are subject to a host of caveats, which make them illustrative 
rather than conclusive, but they do suggest that, in some Latin American countries, fiscal 
austerity involving major infrastructure spending cuts not only entailed a substantial 
growth cost, but also may have been largely ineffective at strengthening public finances. 
 
4. Alternative Rules 
 
If conventional cash deficit and debt targets unduly discourage productive public 
spending, what is the solution? Targeting the cash deficit is just one among many 
possible fiscal rules. The obvious alternative is to look for other fiscal targets and rules 
that enforce solvency but do not do it at the expense of public investment.
39  
 
In general, fiscal rules should meet some basic requirements: they should be 
transparent and easy to monitor, ensure government solvency, make good economic 
sense even in the long run, and properly accommodate different initial conditions.
40 In 
                                                 
38 To quantify this dependence, they rely on estimates of the parameters of an aggregate production 
function augmented with infrastructure, complemented with the estimation of empirical equations linking 
the accumulation of infrastructure assets to observed investment-to-GDP ratios.  
39 See Mintz and Smart (2006) for an overview of alternative rules and their effects on spending decisions. 
40 Buiter (2004).   22
effect, rules pose a tradeoff between simplicity and economic rigor, which different rules 
solve in different ways. A cash deficit rule meets the requirements of transparency and 
easy monitoring but, as discussed above, its economics leave much to be desired. And the 
lack of explicit allowance for initial conditions tends to make cash deficit rules especially 
burdensome for countries whose public infrastructure development is lagging, as their 
choices narrow to postponing such development further, entrusting it to the private 
sector’s decisions, or resorting to large tax efforts to finance it – against the dictates of 
tax smoothing and intergenerational equity.
41  
 
One of the leading alternatives to the conventional cash deficit rule is the golden 
rule, which prevents the government from running a deficit on current account but allows 
borrowing to finance (net) investment – i.e., if the borrowing is used to create assets. To 
put it differently, the golden rule requires that the public sector’s income statement – 
which excludes public investment but includes the depreciation of public capital -- be in 
surplus. This idea of separating the current and the capital budgets is hardly new,
42 but 
has been revived in the last few years (H.M. Treasury 2002, Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2004). Under the golden rule, public debt dynamics and the tax ratio are given by 
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where the second inequality reflects the restriction that the current balance cannot be in 
deficit. In the long run, public debt is fully backed by public capital; i.e.,  pk b ≤ .
43 
 
Unlike conventional deficit targets, the golden rule allows spreading the cost of 
investment over time. Through this mechanism, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) show 
that reformulating the Stability and Growth Pact in terms of a golden rule would allow 
other European Union member countries to devote more resources to improving their 
infrastructure without violating the deficit limits thus redefined. Different versions of the 
golden rule are currently in effect in some countries, most notably the U.K., where its 
application is accompanied by a public debt ceiling restricting overall government 
indebtedness to 40 percent of GDP.
44 
 
However, the golden rule also has major shortcomings.
45 Some are conceptual: 
the fact that debt is fully backed by assets under the golden rule does not suffice to ensure 
solvency, because there is no guarantee that the assets will yield a return high enough to 
cover the interest on the debt that financed their acquisition. The assets could yield low or 
no return (they could be ‘white elephants’). Even if they do yield high returns, the state 
might be unable to capture them.  
                                                 
41 See Van Ewijk (1997) for an estimation of the huge welfare loss that taxpayers would incur if the public 
investment program of the Netherlands had to be financed fully through taxes. 
42 A classic reference is Musgrave (1939). See Bassetto and Sargent (2005) for a historical background. 
43 If the rule were instead designed to allow debt finance of gross (instead of net) investment, then long-run 
debt could exceed the stock of public capital, since in the steady state  pk g b ) / 1 ( δ + ≤ . 
44 H.M. Treasury (2004, page 4). 
45 Balassone and Franco (2000), Buiter (2001) and Calmfors and Corsetti (2003) emphasize its limitations.   23
 
Other limitations are practical: by treating differently current and capital 
spending, the golden rule offers an incentive for opportunistic misclassification of 
unproductive expenditures as ‘investment’, so as to allow financing them with public 
debt and facilitate the achievement of the rule’s zero current balance. Such opportunistic 
behavior is made easier by the lack of a clear-cut conceptual distinction between both 
types of expenditures.  
 
An alternative to the golden rule that overcomes these limitations – at least in 
theory -- is the permanent balance rule, which is a direct application of the intertemporal 
budget constraint.
46 Analogously to consumers’ behavior under the permanent-income 
hypothesis, the rule allows governments to borrow when revenue is temporarily low or 
when present investment opportunities are greater than future investment opportunities. 
 
To highlight the rule’s operation, we can restate the solvency condition for the 
general case in which the growth rate, the real interest rate and the direct financial return 
on public capital are all time-varying: 
 
[] 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ~
)) ( ) ( (




t b ds s i s c s k s s e
t
du u g u r
s
t θ τ    (11) 
 
It is convenient to define the permanent values of the variables, denoted by a bar 
over the corresponding symbols, as: 
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The permanent balance rule is based on an extreme form of tax smoothing: it 
amounts to setting a constant tax / GDP ratio that over the long run suffices to finance the 
government’s present and future expenditure (net of the financial yield on public capital): 
 
b g r k i c ) ( ~ ~ − + − + ≥ = θ τ τ         
 
Under this tax policy, public debt dynamics can be written 
 
                                                 
46 Buiter and Graafe (2004).   24
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Therefore, the rate of debt accumulation permitted by the rule depends on the 
deviation of the different fiscal variables from their permanent levels. From the public 
investment viewpoint, three issues deserve mention: first, the rule allows increasing 
indebtedness when public investment is above its long run level -- i.e., as public assets 
are being built up; second, the rule takes into account the future returns on public capital; 
and third, the rule can also accommodate the indirect return on public capital arising from 
future growth. 
 
How does the permanent balance rule stack up against the requirements outlined 
above? It ensures solvency, provides a suitable treatment of productive expenditures, and 
avoids tax variability. In addition, it allows for the effect of initial conditions on debt 
accumulation limits.
47 Conceptually, the rule fulfills all the requirements. But it entails 
rather stringent informational requirements. In particular, to set taxes today as stated by 
the rule, the policy maker needs access to long-term fiscal projections specifying the 
trajectory of the primary surplus far into the future. Construction of such projections 
raises significant technical and, even more crucially, incentive-compatibility problems 
(see Irwin 2005). 
 
An even more direct way to target public sector net worth would be through a net 
worth fiscal rule, which would set expenditure and financing decisions so as to achieve a 
desired net worth trajectory. This imposes an even more demanding informational burden 
than the permanent balance rule, as it requires constructing a complete balance sheet of 
the public sector and estimating the net worth impact of alternative fiscal policy paths. 
These requirements clearly restrict the applicability of net worth rules. Nevertheless, net 
worth measures and targets have featured for some time among the core principles of 
fiscal management in New Zealand (Janssen 2001),
48 and have featured prominently also 
in some proposals for reform of the European Stability Pact.
49 
 
To confront the limitations of both the golden rule and the permanent balance 
(and net worth) rule, Mintz and Smart (2006) have recently proposed a compromise 
solution: a modified golden rule allowing debt finance of public investment in “self-
liquidating” assets – i.e.,  those that that generate future user fee and/or tax revenue for 
the government so as to “pay for themselves” (such as in the case of utilities) -- but not of 
investment in assets that provide services at no charge. Further, government borrowing 
would be limited to some fraction of the value of the revenue-generating assets, just as 
firms do not finance all their assets with debt. These features would result in a fiscal rule 
more conducive to solvency than the original golden rule, without relying as much on 
                                                 
47 The long-run debt / GDP ratio is not determined by the rule, but depends instead on the trajectory 
followed by the economy. Such indeterminacy can be avoided augmenting the rule with a long-run debt 
target, and letting the tax ratio adjust in response to deviations of the debt ration from the long-run target. 
This defines the "extended rule" of Buiter and Grafe (2004). 
48 The methods employed to evaluate net worth are described by Bradbury, Brumby and Skilling (1999). 
49 For example, one of the reform options outlined by Coeure and Pisani-Ferry (2003) is organized around 
the concept of the "indebtedness ratio that stabilizes net worth".   25
potentially unreliable long-term forecasts as does the permanent balance rule, or 
demanding as much information as a net worth rule.  
 
V. Final Remarks 
 
The conventional practice of using short-term cash flows to gauge the strength of 
public finances is deficient on several counts. It amounts to equating solvency, essentially 
an intertemporal issue, with liquidity, which is instead a short-term concept. This practice 
tends to introduce an anti-investment bias into fiscal discipline that can be, in effect, a 
bias against future growth, with potentially adverse consequences for public finances 
themselves.  
 
Alternative fiscal rules, targeting the current balance, the permanent balance, or 
net worth, can help protect solvency without introducing such biases. Each of these rules 
has advantages and disadvantages, and none of them obviously dominated the others. 
Perhaps the best way in which governments can effectively reduce the biases created by 
the focus on short-term cash flows is by developing indicators of the long-term fiscal 
effects of their decisions, including accounting and economic measures of net worth, and 
where appropriate including such measures in fiscal targets and fiscal rules, replacing 
today’s almost exclusive focus on liquidity and debt.
51 
 
One risk posed by more investment-neutral fiscal targets and rules is that, by 
enlarging the room for investment, they can also lead to more wasteful projects being 
adopted – such as roads to nowhere and loss-making power plants.
52 Wasteful 
investments could be due to faulty economic analysis or motivated by corruption and 
patronage. Hence, the extra degrees of freedom gained by adopting investment-neutral 
fiscal rules also raise the value of institutional and capacity enhancements that prevent 
public resource waste. 
 
A key step in that direction is to enhance project selection procedures and 
capabilities, including more systematic reliance on cost-benefit analysis whenever this 
evaluation method is likely to be useful for decision making, such as when charging users 
is difficult or undesirable (for example, most roads). More generally, strengthening fiscal 
and budgetary institutions, and in particular fiscal checks and balances to correct the 
perverse political economy incentives that encourage wasteful spending (such as for 
purposes of political patronage) is essential to minimize the scope for waste disguised as 
public investment.  
 
The preceding discussion does not imply that governments should stop paying 
attention to conventional measures of short-term fiscal performance such as the overall 
cash balance. After all, there are good reasons why short run fiscal aggregates should be 
closely watched. The overall cash balance (or, even better, the public sector borrowing 
requirement, which adds to the overall balance the public sector’s net lending) offers a 
                                                 
51 The3se issues are discussed at length by Easterly, Irwin and Servén (2007). 
52 See Keefer and Knack (2006) and Pritchett (2000).   26
fairly good approximation to the government’s financing needs, a primary concern for the 
fiscal authorities as well as financial market participants. It provides also an indication of 
the public sector’s contribution to aggregate demand and thus its stance from the 
viewpoint of short-term stabilization—although the primary deficit may be preferable for 
this purpose, and even more so if estimated in structural terms, correcting for the effects 
of cyclical conditions. 
 
But the overall cash balance and gross debt are much less adequate as solvency 
measures, basically because they do not take into account the assets and the future 
incomes that the government may acquire by incurring debt today. This, of course, is 
hardly surprising: liquidity and solvency are fundamentally different concepts, and 
different indicators are needed to gauge them—as is the case in corporate finance. 
Forcing the overall balance to summarize all three dimensions—public sector solvency, 
liquidity, and macroeconomic stance—is asking too much from a single indicator. 
 





1. Derivation of Equation (8) 
 
Taking the time derivative of equation (7), and using equation (5), the real growth rate 
can be written as follows: 
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Thus, other things equal, the growth impact of a given change in the public investment 
ratio is smaller the higher the prevailing public capital-to-output ratio k. Combining 
equation (A1) with equation (5), we get a differential equation describing the trajectory of 
k, whose solution with a constant investment ratio is as follows: 
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where k0 denotes the capital-to-output ratio at time 0. Replacing this expression into 
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Given the initial public capital ratio, this is an increasing function of the public 
investment rate i. Furthermore, the growth rate converges toγ  as s goes to infinity. 
Replacing equations (A2) and (A3) into equation (4) (with t = 0 to simplify notation)—
and still assuming a constant real interest rate r (with  γ > r ), as well as constant public 




2. The Case of Constant Marginal Productivity 
 
The main text assumes that the marginal product of public capital declines with the 
capital stock, by taking 1 0 α >> in the production function  [ ]
α γ α − =
1 ) ( ) ( ) (
s e s L s K A s Y . 
Letting 1 α = , we get an AK growth model in which the marginal product of public 
capital is constant. In fact, it is easy to generalize this technology to  ( ) ( ) Ys A Ks β =+ , 
where returns to scale are decreasing, constant, or increasing depending on whetherβ is 
positive, zero, or negative. Now the rate of output growth can be expressed as follows: 
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Thus, the (marginal) impact of public investment on growth is constant, but as long as 
0 ≠ δ  the growth rate is inversely related to the public capital-to-output ratio. Assuming 
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The top line of this expression is analogous to that of equation (8) for the case of zero net 
investment (and  0 γ = ). In turn, the second line captures the effects of a changing capital 
stock, which affects net worth through the already familiar return differential on new 
capital, and the (net) tax revenue collected on the output generated with the extra capital, 
() cA τ −  . In fact, the term in the small square brackets is exactly the same as that in the 
numerator of equation (9), with  YK A ∂∂=. 
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53 In deriving equation (A5), we need to assume that  () pr A i δ + >  for the present value of future primary 
surpluses to remain bounded. If this holds at time 0, then the numerator of (A6) and the denominator of 
(A7) must also be positive.   29
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